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Abstract
We introduce a new approach to showing existence of equilibrium in
models of economies with unbounded short sales. Inspired by the pioneer-
ing works of Hart (1974) on asset market models, Grandmont (1977) on
temporary economic equilibrium, and of Werner (1987) on general equi-
librium exchange economies, all papers known to us stating conditions for
existence of equilibrium with unbounded short sales place conditions on
recession cones of agents’ preferred sets or, more recently, require com-
pactness of the utility possibilities set.. In contrast, in this paper, we
place conditions on the preferred sets themselves. Roughly, our condition
is that the sum of the weakly preferred sets is a closed set. We demon-
strate that our condition implies existence of equilibrium. In addition to
our main theorem, we present two theo r e m ss h o w i n gc a s e st ow h i c ho u r
main theorem can we applied. We also relate our condition to the classic
condition of Hart (1974).
∗We are pleased to dedicate this paper to Cuong Le Van, a great economist and a won-
derful friend. Without the hospitality of the Centre for Economics of the Sorbonne, whose
ﬁrst Director was Professor Le Van, and the hospitality of CERMSEM and Paris 1 the idea
of this paper would probably not have happened. It was sitting outside a cafe across the
street from the Maison des Sciences Economiques that one the authors of this paper raised
the question of "why not assumptions simply on preferred sets" and another author took
up the idea. We are honored to have beneﬁtted from Cuong Le Van’s intellectual generos-
ity and to advance a line of research to which he has been one of the main contributors.
We would also like to thank Nizar Allouch for comments and the participants at the Paris
conference in honor of Cuong Le Van, December 2011.
11 Introduction
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the closedness of the
sum of weakly preferred sets at individual rational vectors ensures existence of equi-
librium in economies with unbounded short sales. This is in contrast to a large
number of papers providing existence results based on asymptotic cones of weakly
preferred sets or on the set of attainable utility vectors.1
When unbounded short sales are allowed, in contrast to Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
general equilibrium models, consumption sets are unbounded below. This prob-
lem was studied in the seminal works of Hart (1974) in asset market models2 and
in Green (1973) and Grandmont (1977,1982) for temporary equilibrium models.
Arbitrage conditions suﬃcient to guarantee existence of equilibrium in general equi-
librium models of unbounded exchange economies (e.g., asset exchange economies
allowing short sales) have been studied by Hammond (1982), Werner (1987), Nielsen
(1989), Page and Wooders (1996), and more recently by Page, Wooders, and Mon-
teiro (1999), Allouch, Le Van and Page 2002) among others. All these papers place
conditions limiting arbitrage opportunities on the recession cones of the preferred
sets of agents, thus ruling out arbitrarily large trades. A signiﬁcant advance was
made by Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999), who introduced the condition of com-
pactness of the utility possibilities set and show that all prior conditions ensuring
existence of equilibrium imply their conditions.3
To illustrate the problem created by unbounded short sales for existence of economic
equilibrium, suppose that two agents have diametrically opposed preferences. For
example, one agent may want to buy arbitrarily large amounts of one commodity and
sell another commodity short while the other agent may prefer to do the opposite.
In such a situation, there are unbounded arbitrage opportunities and no equilibrium
exists. To ensure existence of equilibrium arbitrage opportunities must be limited.
Note that the idea that agents do not have diametrically opposed preferences is a
statement about relationships of the sets of allocations preferred or weakly preferred
to the endowments.
Our condition ensuring existence of equilibrium, introduced in this paper, is simply
that the sum of the weakly preferred sets (each assumed to be closed) is closed. Thus,
recession cones do not appear in the condition. For the current paper, we relate our
results to the classic result of Hart (1974) in more detail. Other conditions equivalent
to that of this paper and the relationships of our condition to other conditions in
1See Ha-Huy (2011) for a recent survey.
2See also Milne (1981), Hammond (1983), Page (1987, 1996), among others.
3See also Allouch (2002)
2the literature, especially the compactness condition of Dana, Le Van and Magnien
(1999), is left to further research.
2 Sum of closed sets and existence of equilibrium
We consider an exchange economy E with commodity space V ,assumed to be a
ﬁnite-dimensional vector space. There is a ﬁnite set I of consumers. Each consumer
i ∈ I is described by a consumption set Xi (a closed convex non-empty set of V ),
an endowment vector ωi ∈ Xi, and a convex preference relation Ri ⊂ Xi × Xi (a
convex continuous complete transitive and reﬂexive binary relation Ri). For a point
x ∈ Xi, we denote by Pi(x) the preferred set of x,
Pi(x) := {x
′ ∈ Xi : x
′Pix}
and we denote by Ri(x) the weakly preferred set,
Ri(x) := {x
′ ∈ Xi : x
′Rix}.
Note that by the deﬁnition of Ri(ωi), for each i ∈ I , it holds that:
Ri(ωi) ⊂ Xi. (1)
We will assume Ri(x) is a unbounded closed convex set, and Pi(x) coincides with
the set of interior points of Ri(x), Pi(x) = intRi(x). 4
An allocation xi ∈ Xi for player i is individually rational if xi ∈ Ri(ωi). The
attainable individual rational allocations constitute the set
A := {y = (yi)i∈I ∈
Y
i
Ri(ωi) :
X
i
yi =
X
i
ωi}.
The dual of V (the set linear functionals on V ) is denoted by V ∗ and constitutes
the space of prices.
Given prices p ∈ V ∗, we let
Bi(p) := {x ∈ V |p(x − ωi) ≤ 0}
denote the budget set of the i-th agent, i ∈ I. Our deﬁnition of equilibrium is
standard.
4If we assume that endowment vectors belong to the interiors of the consumption sets, that is,
ωi ∈ intXi, for all i, then the assumption Pi(x) = intRi(x) need not be made.
3Deﬁnition. An equilibrium is a tuple (xi)i∈I ∈ A and prices p ∈ V ∗ such that, for
each i ∈ I, xi ∈ Bi(p) and Pi(xi) ∩ Bi(p) = ∅.
For an economy with bounded short sales, since the following property always holds,
it can be applied to the weakly preferred sets of agents:
The sum of ﬁnitely many convex sets is a convex set. (2)
For an economy with unbounded short sales, except of some apparently mild tech-
nical assumptions on the primitives of the economy, we have to require the following
property for the weakly preferred sets:
The sum of ﬁnitely many closed convex sets is a closed convex set. (3)
Contrary to property (2), property (3) is not generally satisﬁed (see Example 1
below). Therefore we have either to require validity of (3) for weakly preferred sets
or to consider a subclass of convex sets in which (3) is fulﬁlled. An example of
such a subclass is the class of polyhedral sets (see, for example, [14]). More subtle
examples are studied in [5].
Recall that the recession cone Rec(A) of a set A ⊂ V is a maximal cone C of V
such that A+C = A. For a cone C ⊂ V , the cone C∗ = {x ∈ V, x(c) ≤ 0, for every
c ∈ C} is a polar cone to C.
Our existence result requires two technical assumptions on the primitives of the
economy.5 The ﬁrst is a kind of ‘nice boundary condition’ on individual preferences.
Speciﬁcally, preferences of each agent i ∈ I are required to satisfy the following
property
For each p ∈ (RecRi(ωi))∗ there exists yi ∈ Ri(ωi) satisfying
Pi(yi) ∩ {x : p(x − ωi) ≤ 0} = ∅.
(4)
This condition ensures that, given a price p in a restricted set of prices, either there
exists some preferred allocation that is not aﬀordable with the budget constraint
determined by those prices or the hyperplane p(x) = p(ωi) is an asymptote to the
set of allocations RecRi(ωi).6 For example, (4) holds if there exists yi ∈ V such
that:
Pi(yi) ⊂ ωi + (−RecRi(ωi))
∗.
5In this paper, we are not pursuing for the strongest form of technical assumptions.
6The condition (4) rules out the necesssity of a ”no satiation” condition. Such conditions has
been much studied in the leterature on unbounded short sales.
4Our second technical assumption is:
There exists ˆ p ∈ V
∗ \ 0, a ∈ V, such that for all i ∈ I,
Ri(ωi) ⊆ {x : ˆ p(x) ≥ 0} + a. (5)
This is simply the requirement that there is a hyperplane for which the preferred
sets of all agents are on one side of the hyperplane.
Theorem 1 Assume that the economy E satisﬁes (4), (5), and the following prop-
erty:
For any individually rational allocation (x1,...,x|I|) the sum P
i∈I Ri(xi) is closed. (6)
Then there exists and equilibrium.
Condition (6) points us to the question of closedness of the sum of closed sets. This
sum is not always closed, contrary, for example, to the property that the sum of
convex sets is always convex. The following example also appears in Florenzano and
Le Van (2001, p14).
Example. The sets A = {(x,y) : xy ≥ 1,x,y ≥ 0} and B := {(x,y) : xy ≤ −1,x ≤
0, y ≥ 0} are closed. But the sum A + B = {(x,y) : y > 0} is not (see Figure 1).
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-
A = {xy ≥ 1,x ≥ 0,y ≥ 0} B = {xy ≤ −1,x ≤ 0,y ≥ 0}
6
-
6
-
A + B = {(x,y) : y > 0}
Figure 1.
The following two theorems are corollaries of the main theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume that the economy E satisﬁes (4), (5), and, for each i ∈ I and
each xi ∈ R(ωi), the set
Ri(xi) is a polyhedral set. (7)
Then there exists equilibrium.
Proof. The sum of a ﬁnite set of polyhedral sets is a closed convex set ([14]).
Because of this, from (7) follows (6). Thus the conditions of Theorem 1 are met. ￿
Theorem 3 Assume that the economy E satisﬁes (4), (5) and there exists a pointed
cone C, such that for each i ∈ I, it holds that
Ri(ωi) ⊂ C. (8)
6Then there exists equilibrium.
Proof. We have to check that validity of (8) implies validity (6). This follows from
[19]. ￿
Before going to prove the main theorem, we will relate our result to Hart’s (1974)
classic result.
3 Hart’s no arbitrage condition and sums of closed
sets
Hart (1974) introduces a version of the condition of Weak No Market Arbitrage
(WNMA) on net trades. Recall that the lineal Lin(A) of a set A ⊂ V is a maximal
linear subspace L of V such that A + L = A.
Deﬁnition 1 The economy E satisﬁes WNMA
For any tuple yi ∈ Rec(Ri(ωi)),i ∈ I such that
P
i∈I yi = 0,
it holds that yi ∈ Lin(Ri(ωi)) for each i ∈ I. (9)
Proposition 1 Let the WNMA condition hold. Then
P
i∈I Ri(ωi) is closed.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 9.1.1 in Rockafellar (1970). Q.E.D.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, Hart also assumed the validity of a uni-
formity condition7: Uniformity implies that
Lin(Ri(ωi)) = Lin(Ri(x)) for any x ∈ Ri(ωi). (10)
Uniformity and WNMA together imply condition (6). In fact, since the recession
cone is a monotone operator with respect to set inclusion (RecB ⊂ RecA if B ⊂ A)
we have the validity of WNMA for all sets Ri(xi) with individually rational xi, i ∈ I.
Due to Proposition 1, we obtain the validity of (6).
Thus, as a consequence of this and Theorem 1, we obtain a variant of Hart’s theorem.
Corollary 1 Let the economy E satisfy (2), WNMA and Uniformity. Then there
exists an equilibrium of the economy E.
7A number of papers in the literature have required that arbitrage opportunities be invariant
or uniform with respect to endowments; see, for example, Allouch, Le Van and Page (2002).
74 A proof of the Main Theorem
First, we deﬁne a normalized price set. For that, for each i ∈ I , we deﬁne a maximal
cone Ri with the following property:
for any x ∈ Ri(ωi), there holds Pi(x) + Ri ⊂ Pi(x).
Consider the following set
P := a base of the cone{p ∈ V
∗ : p ∈
\
i
R
∗
i}.
From (5) the set P is a non-empty convex compact.
We deﬁne a correspondence f : P ⇒ P. For p ∈ P, f(p) is deﬁned using the
following auxiliary construction. Speciﬁcally, for a given price vector p, we modify
the economy. In the modiﬁed economy, each agent i ∈ I has the same endowment ωi
and the same consumption set Xi as in the initial economy. The modiﬁed preference
relation Ri(p) ⊂ Xi × Xi is deﬁned by the following rule: pick the most preferred
element xi(p) with respect to the initial relation Ri within the budget set Bi(p) =
{x ∈ Xi : p(x) ≤ p(ωi)}. Since p ∈
T
i R∗
i and due to assumption (4), such an
element either exists or the hyperplane p(x) = p(ωi) is an asymptote to some Ri(p).
Let Ii(p) := {x ∈ Xi : xIixi(p)} be the indiﬀerence level passing through xi(p) if
xi(p) exists, and let Ii(p) be the indiﬀerence level Ii(p) otherwise (see Figure 2).
Pick a direction qi ∈ int(∩x∈Ri(ωi)Rec(Ri(x))). Then deﬁne the indiﬀerence levels of
the modiﬁed preference Ri(p) by parallel translations of Ii(p) in the direction qi.
Now let αi be such that the point xi(p) − αiqi belong to an indiﬀerent level of the
modiﬁed preference, which passes through the endowment ωi (see Picture 3).
8￿
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Picture 3.
9Now, due to the closedness assumption (3), we can aggregate the modiﬁed prefer-
ences. That is, we deﬁne indiﬀerence levels of the aggregated preference from
X
i
(Ii(p) + αiqit), if t ∈ [−1,0] and
X
i
(Ii(p) + qit), if t ≥ 0.
Denote by e I(
P
i∈I ωi) the modiﬁed indiﬀerence level passing through
P
i∈I ωi. Let
CI(
P
i∈I ωi) be the convex set bounded by e I(
P
i∈I ωi). Denote by f(p) the normal
cone8 to CI(
P
i∈I ωi) at
P
i∈I ωi.
Thus, the auxiliary construction is ﬁnished, the mapping f(p) is speciﬁed, and the
correspondence f : P ⇒ P is deﬁned.
By standard arguments, the correspondence f : P ⇒ P is upper semi-continuous.
Then there exists a ﬁxed point p∗ ∈ f(p∗). This ﬁxed point provides us with an
equilibrium in the initial economy. Q.E.D.
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